Decentralized Mechanism Design Impossibility and Cryptographic Circumvention
This research reveals the fundamental impossibility of fully collusion-resistant blockchain transaction mechanisms, proposing cryptographic techniques to build robust alternatives.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Active Block Producer Model Fundamentally Limits Transaction Fee Mechanism Welfare
The SAKA mechanism is a novel game-theoretic solution that achieves incentive compatibility across users and block producers while guaranteeing half of the maximum social welfare.
Decentralized Order Flow Auction Secures Transaction Ordering Neutrality
A new mechanism design decentralizes block construction, using cryptographic commitments to enforce fair, censorship-resistant transaction ordering.
Novel Auxiliary Mechanism Design Achieves Truthfulness, Collusion-Proofness, and Non-Zero Miner Revenue
By shifting from dominant to Bayesian incentive compatibility, this new auxiliary mechanism method breaks the zero-revenue barrier for secure transaction fee design.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, achieves strongly incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation for multi-proposer consensus, securing welfare.
