Cryptographic Second Price Auctions Secure Transaction Ordering and Mitigate Adversarial MEV
Encrypting transaction bids via a Cryptographic Second Price Auction formally decouples miner revenue from user incentives, ensuring provably fair block construction.
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence-Proof Fee Mechanisms via a Burn Identity
Foundational mechanism design proves that off-chain influence-proof transaction fees are mathematically equivalent to a novel burn identity, securing transaction ordering.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Active Block Producers
Introducing the SAKA mechanism, this work circumvents TFM impossibility results by integrating MEV searchers to align incentives and guarantee approximate welfare.
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Overcomes MEV Impossibility with Searcher Augmentation
The SAKA mechanism resolves the TFM impossibility theorem for active block producers by integrating MEV searchers to ensure incentive compatibility and welfare.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Challenges EIP-1559 and Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
This research introduces off-chain influence proofness, demonstrating EIP-1559's vulnerability to censorship threats and proving fundamental limits on TFM design.
