Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Mechanism Design Characterizes Decentralized Verifiable Computation Incentives
This research fundamentally characterizes incentive mechanisms for verifiable computation, balancing decentralization against execution efficiency in strategic environments.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Designing Fair Transaction Fee Mechanisms for Leaderless Blockchains
This research introduces a game-theoretic model and a novel auction mechanism, FPA-EQ, ensuring fair and efficient transaction processing in emerging leaderless blockchain architectures.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Commitments without Mediators
This framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs for private mechanism commitment and execution, ensuring verifiable properties without disclosure or mediators.
Private Mechanism Design through Zero-Knowledge Commitments
This research introduces a novel framework for private mechanism design, enabling verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive information or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design without Mediators
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing mechanisms privately, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to ensure verifiability without revealing sensitive information.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments without Mediators
This work introduces zero-knowledge proofs to mechanism design, allowing verifiable, private economic interactions without revealing underlying rules or needing trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment in Mechanism Design
This research introduces a framework for private mechanism design, allowing verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive details, thereby enhancing trust and efficiency in decentralized systems.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing economic mechanisms without revealing their details, ensuring verifiable properties via zero-knowledge proofs.
Blockchain Mechanism Design: Unique Challenges and Strategic Imperatives
New research illuminates the inherent complexities of designing incentive mechanisms within permissionless blockchains, revealing novel challenges in economic coordination and protocol security.
Auctioning Transaction Time Advantage Reshapes MEV Dynamics
This research introduces a time-advantage auction mechanism, fundamentally altering how Maximal Extractable Value is distributed and potentially enabling fairer transaction ordering.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Commitment
A novel framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs to execute economic mechanisms privately, ensuring verifiable commitment without revealing sensitive design parameters.
New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Yields Truthful, Collusion-Proof Blockchain Transaction Fees
This research introduces an auxiliary mechanism method to design transaction fee mechanisms that overcome existing impossibility results, enabling positive miner revenue while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties in blockchain systems.
MEV Necessitates New Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanism Designs
This research fundamentally redefines transaction fee mechanism design by integrating active block producer behavior and proposing a novel sybil-proof auction for enhanced welfare.
