Bayesian Mechanism Design Yields Truthful, Collusion-Proof Blockchain Transaction Fees
This research introduces an auxiliary mechanism method to design transaction fee mechanisms that overcome existing impossibility results, enabling positive miner revenue while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties in blockchain systems.
New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Commitment
A novel framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs to execute economic mechanisms privately, ensuring verifiable commitment without revealing sensitive design parameters.
Auctioning Transaction Time Advantage Reshapes MEV Dynamics
This research introduces a time-advantage auction mechanism, fundamentally altering how Maximal Extractable Value is distributed and potentially enabling fairer transaction ordering.
Blockchain Mechanism Design: Unique Challenges and Strategic Imperatives
New research illuminates the inherent complexities of designing incentive mechanisms within permissionless blockchains, revealing novel challenges in economic coordination and protocol security.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing economic mechanisms without revealing their details, ensuring verifiable properties via zero-knowledge proofs.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment in Mechanism Design
This research introduces a framework for private mechanism design, allowing verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive details, thereby enhancing trust and efficiency in decentralized systems.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments without Mediators
This work introduces zero-knowledge proofs to mechanism design, allowing verifiable, private economic interactions without revealing underlying rules or needing trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design without Mediators
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing mechanisms privately, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to ensure verifiability without revealing sensitive information.
