New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Mechanism Design Characterizes Decentralized Verifiable Computation Incentives
This research fundamentally characterizes incentive mechanisms for verifiable computation, balancing decentralization against execution efficiency in strategic environments.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Designing Fair Transaction Fee Mechanisms for Leaderless Blockchains
This research introduces a game-theoretic model and a novel auction mechanism, FPA-EQ, ensuring fair and efficient transaction processing in emerging leaderless blockchain architectures.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Commitments without Mediators
This framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs for private mechanism commitment and execution, ensuring verifiable properties without disclosure or mediators.
Private Mechanism Design through Zero-Knowledge Commitments
This research introduces a novel framework for private mechanism design, enabling verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive information or requiring trusted intermediaries.
