Active Block Producers Create Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible Fee Mechanisms
Formal analysis proves active block producers, driven by private MEV, fundamentally prevent simultaneous incentive-compatibility and welfare-maximization.
Dual-Auction Mechanism Decouples ZK-Rollup Proving from Centralization Risk
A two-sided auction mechanism called Prooφ formally decentralizes ZK-Rollup proving, ensuring efficiency and resistance to prover collusion.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Formalizing Blockchain Incentive Compatibility through New Economic Primitives
The research defines MMIC and OCA-proofness, new game-theoretic primitives that formally analyze and secure transaction fee mechanisms against collusion.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
