Distributed Threshold Encryption Mitigates MEV for Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Distributed threshold encryption conceals transaction content from block producers, enforcing fair ordering and eliminating front-running opportunities.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy Proofness for Automated Market Makers
Researchers devised a new AMM mechanism that uses a constant potential function to eliminate MEV, achieving provable strategy proofness at the application layer.
Application-Layer Mechanism Eliminates Arbitrage and MEV in Decentralized Finance
A novel AMM mechanism processes transactions in batches using a constant potential function, guaranteeing arbitrage resilience and user incentive compatibility.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Time-Bound Signatures Restore EIP-1559 Equilibrium and Mitigate MEV Extraction
A modified Schnorr signature scheme expiring at a specific block height forces block producers to include transactions, curbing harmful MEV and stabilizing fee markets.
Commitment-Reveal Decouples Ordering from Value to Ensure Fairness
A novel two-phase commitment-reveal protocol decouples transaction ordering from content knowledge, eliminating block producer MEV extraction and ensuring provably fair sequencing.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Designing Transaction Fee Mechanisms in a Post-MEV Blockchain World
This research unveils the inherent challenges of transaction fee mechanism design in MEV-rich environments, proposing a novel framework to balance incentives.
