Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Commitment-Reveal Decouples Ordering from Value to Ensure Fairness
A novel two-phase commitment-reveal protocol decouples transaction ordering from content knowledge, eliminating block producer MEV extraction and ensuring provably fair sequencing.
Time-Bound Signatures Restore EIP-1559 Equilibrium and Mitigate MEV Extraction
A modified Schnorr signature scheme expiring at a specific block height forces block producers to include transactions, curbing harmful MEV and stabilizing fee markets.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Application-Layer Mechanism Eliminates Arbitrage and MEV in Decentralized Finance
A novel AMM mechanism processes transactions in batches using a constant potential function, guaranteeing arbitrage resilience and user incentive compatibility.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy Proofness for Automated Market Makers
Researchers devised a new AMM mechanism that uses a constant potential function to eliminate MEV, achieving provable strategy proofness at the application layer.
Distributed Threshold Encryption Mitigates MEV for Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Distributed threshold encryption conceals transaction content from block producers, enforcing fair ordering and eliminating front-running opportunities.
FairFlow: Randomized Ordering and Auction Mechanisms Mitigate MEV
The FairFlow Protocol integrates randomized transaction ordering and auction mechanisms to reduce MEV extraction by 60%, fortifying on-chain fairness.
