Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Fair Transaction Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic mechanism, SAKA, circumvents a fundamental impossibility result, achieving incentive-compatibility and 50% welfare for transaction ordering.
Batch Processing AMM Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
This new batch-clearing AMM mechanism formally eliminates miner extractable value by settling all trades at a single price, ensuring strategy-proof execution.
Active Block Producer Model Fundamentally Limits Transaction Fee Mechanism Welfare
The SAKA mechanism is a novel game-theoretic solution that achieves incentive compatibility across users and block producers while guaranteeing half of the maximum social welfare.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
