Block production refers to the process of creating new blocks of transactions on a blockchain. This involves network participants, often called miners or validators, who bundle pending transactions into a block and add it to the existing chain. The successful production of a block typically rewards the producer with newly minted cryptocurrency and transaction fees, incentivizing network security and operation.
Context
Discussions surrounding block production frequently center on the energy consumption of proof-of-work mechanisms versus the more energy-efficient consensus algorithms like proof-of-stake. The efficiency and security of block production directly influence transaction confirmation times and network scalability, key metrics for evaluating a cryptocurrency’s viability and adoption. Ongoing developments aim to optimize block production to support higher transaction throughput without compromising decentralization or security.
Proof of Compute re-engineers consensus by rewarding verifiable ZK computation, fundamentally transforming computational work into a yield-bearing asset.
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
The Rio hardfork delivers a payments-grade network by achieving 5k TPS and stateless validation, fundamentally securing Layer 2 finality for enterprise adoption.
This research designs transaction fee mechanisms to economically incentivize multiple block proposers, fundamentally countering censorship and bribery in decentralized networks.
This research introduces a formal, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.
This research fundamentally redefines transaction fee mechanism design by integrating active block producer behavior and proposing a novel sybil-proof auction for enhanced welfare.
This research introduces the SAKA mechanism, a sybil-proof, incentive-compatible transaction fee design that mitigates MEV's negative impact on blockchain welfare.
A novel ticketing mechanism aims to integrate Maximal Extractable Value directly into the Ethereum protocol, fostering fairer distribution and network robustness.
This research introduces Execution Tickets, a novel mechanism to integrate Maximal Extractable Value directly into the Ethereum protocol, shifting value capture from external entities to the network itself.
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