Proposer-Builder Separation Shifts Centralization to Block Builders
Mathematical models quantify how Proposer-Builder Separation equalizes validator rewards but concentrates power in a few skilled block builders, creating a Proof-of-MEV paradigm.
Cryptographic Sortition Decentralizes Transaction Ordering Preventing MEV Extraction
A new Verifiable Sortition Orderer mechanism uses cryptographic randomness to break the proposer's monopoly on ordering, mitigating systemic MEV.
Decoupled Time-Lock Commitments Enforce Fair Transaction Ordering
Introducing Decoupled Time-Lock Commitments, a new primitive that uses VDFs to cryptographically enforce a future transaction reveal, fundamentally eliminating proposer-side MEV.
Threshold Cryptography Decentralizes Block Building and Eliminates Centralized MEV Extraction
The Threshold-Secret-Shared Block Construction mechanism uses distributed cryptography to transform centralized MEV extraction into a fair, cooperative process.
Time-Locked Commit-Reveal Ordering Fundamentally Secures Transaction Sequencing against MEV
Enforcing transaction ordering on encrypted, time-locked commitments eliminates content-based front-running, guaranteeing fair execution and market integrity.
Game Theory Secures Verifiable Secret Sharing against Rational Collusion
A new mechanism design framework embeds a parameterized payment rule into Verifiable Secret Sharing, strategically disincentivizing rational collusion for enhanced decentralized security.
