Protected Order Flow Secures Transactions, Aligning Validator Incentives
PROF introduces an incentive-compatible mechanism that enforces private transaction ordering within PBS, mitigating harmful MEV while preserving validator profitability.
Differential Privacy Enforces Transaction Ordering Fairness, Securing Decentralized Systems
Researchers established that any Differential Privacy mechanism can enforce fair transaction ordering, transforming a privacy tool into a core mechanism design primitive for decentralized systems.
Proof of Compute Transforms Verifiable Work into a Consensus Primitive
Proof of Compute re-engineers consensus by rewarding verifiable ZK computation, fundamentally transforming computational work into a yield-bearing asset.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Fairness: Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism for MEV-Resistant Execution
A Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism cryptographically enforces transaction fairness, eliminating front-running by decoupling ordering from block production.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
