Verifiable Functions Forge Decentralized Consensus Eliminating Predictability and Centralization
PoVF introduces a novel consensus mechanism combining two verifiable functions to guarantee provably fair leader election and eliminate centralization risk.
Mechanized Formal Verification Proves Absolute Bounds on Extractable Value
Formalizing MEV strategies within the Lean theorem prover provides machine-checked proofs of adversarial extraction limits, enabling provably secure DeFi.
Decentralized Private Computation Unlocks Programmable Privacy and Verifiability
Research introduces Decentralized Private Computation, a ZKP-based record model that shifts confidential execution off-chain, enabling verifiable, private smart contracts.
New Lower Bounds Define Communication Limits for Dishonest-Majority Broadcast Protocols
This research establishes fundamental communication lower bounds for randomized Byzantine broadcast in dishonest-majority networks, framing the ultimate scalability limits.
DAG Architecture Enables Provably Fair, High-Throughput Decentralized Transaction Ordering
FairDAG integrates fairness protocols into multi-proposer DAG consensus, eliminating leader-based MEV while achieving superior throughput.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Private Decentralized Federated Learning Consensus
ZKPoT introduces a zk-SNARK-based consensus mechanism that proves model accuracy without revealing private data, resolving the critical privacy-accuracy trade-off in decentralized AI.
Proof of Crowdsourcing Work Transforms Wasted Mining Energy into Useful Computation
Proof of Crowdsourcing Work (PoCW) leverages miner computation for general crowdsourced tasks, establishing a dual-purpose, energy-efficient consensus mechanism.
Hybrid BFT Achieves Both Probabilistic Speed and Periodic Finality
Albatross combines speculative BFT's high throughput with Tendermint's periodic provable finality, resolving the performance-finality consensus trade-off.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
