Active Block Producers Undermine Transaction Fee Mechanism Incentive Compatibility
This research reveals active block producers fundamentally complicate transaction fee mechanism design, necessitating augmented protocols for robust incentive alignment.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Truthfulness
This research leverages Bayesian game theory to design blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, overcoming prior limitations to enable non-zero miner revenue while maintaining user truthfulness.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, leveraging Bayesian game theory, to ensure miner revenue and user truthfulness, resolving a critical blockchain economic dilemma.
Auctioning Transaction Time Advantage Reshapes MEV Dynamics
This research introduces a time-advantage auction mechanism, fundamentally altering how Maximal Extractable Value is distributed and potentially enabling fairer transaction ordering.
New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
Execution Tickets: Protocolizing MEV for Equitable Blockchain Value Distribution
A novel ticketing mechanism is proposed to integrate Maximal Extractable Value directly into the Ethereum protocol, fostering fairer value distribution and enhancing network robustness.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Yields Truthful, Collusion-Proof Blockchain Transaction Fees
This research introduces an auxiliary mechanism method to design transaction fee mechanisms that overcome existing impossibility results, enabling positive miner revenue while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties in blockchain systems.
Polkadot DAO Implements Hard Cap on DOT Token Supply
Polkadot's DAO caps DOT supply at 2.1 billion, fortifying long-term value and attracting institutional capital via predictable tokenomics.
MEV Necessitates New Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanism Designs
This research fundamentally redefines transaction fee mechanism design by integrating active block producer behavior and proposing a novel sybil-proof auction for enhanced welfare.
