Application-Layer Mechanism Design Guarantees Strategy Proofness for AMMs
By shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contract design, a new mechanism guarantees strategy proofness and arbitrage resilience for automated market makers.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Bitcoin Falls to 15-Week Low Amidst Renewed Bank Stress
Bitcoin dropped below $105,000, hitting a 15-week low as concerns over US regional banks resurfaced, impacting broader market sentiment.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
Reasonable-World Assumption Solves Zero Miner Revenue Impossibility Theorem
A new mechanism design incorporates honest user assumptions to achieve asymptotically optimal miner revenue, resolving a core theoretical conflict.
Decentralized Mechanism Design Impossibility and Cryptographic Circumvention
This research reveals the fundamental impossibility of fully collusion-resistant blockchain transaction mechanisms, proposing cryptographic techniques to build robust alternatives.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees
This research designs a truthful, collusion-proof transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner revenue and network stability through a novel Bayesian approach.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees and Miner Revenue
This research pioneers a Bayesian approach to blockchain transaction fees, overcoming prior incentive limitations and ensuring sustainable miner compensation.
