SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Active Block Producers
Introducing the SAKA mechanism, this work circumvents TFM impossibility results by integrating MEV searchers to align incentives and guarantee approximate welfare.
Searcher-Auction Mechanism Solves Transaction Fee Incentive Impossibility
Mechanism design incorporating searchers is a theoretical necessity to achieve incentive-compatible transaction fee mechanisms and high social welfare simultaneously.
Active Block Producer Model Fundamentally Limits Transaction Fee Mechanism Welfare
The SAKA mechanism is a novel game-theoretic solution that achieves incentive compatibility across users and block producers while guaranteeing half of the maximum social welfare.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Revert-Based MEV Is an Equilibrium Outcome on Fast-Finality Rollups
This research reveals how transaction reverts on rollups are not errors but strategic MEV outcomes, driven by trade-splitting and duplication, demanding protocol reforms.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Scalable Blockchain Security and Mechanism Design
A novel MEV auction mechanism integrates programmable privacy and explicit bidding, redefining blockchain scalability by mitigating economic spam.
MEV Limits Blockchain Scaling, Demands New Economic Design
This research establishes Maximal Extractable Value as the primary economic constraint on blockchain scalability, advocating for new auction designs to efficiently allocate blockspace.
