Dual-Auction Mechanism Decouples ZK-Rollup Proving from Centralization Risk
A two-sided auction mechanism called Prooφ formally decentralizes ZK-Rollup proving, ensuring efficiency and resistance to prover collusion.
Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism Achieves Optimal Miner Revenue and Strategy-Proofness
A new Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism leverages a soft second-price auction to achieve optimal miner revenue while preserving strategy-proofness.
Reasonable-World Assumptions Achieve Optimal Miner Revenue in Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing reasonable-world assumptions circumvents the zero-revenue impossibility result, enabling incentive-compatible transaction fee auctions.
Epidemic Consensus Achieves Leaderless Extreme-Scale Blockchain Decentralization
BECP introduces a leaderless, epidemic communication model for consensus, fundamentally solving the scalability-decentralization trade-off for extreme-scale networks.
Epidemic Consensus Achieves Leaderless, Extreme-Scale, Collusion-Resistant Blockchain Finality
This new leaderless consensus protocol, Blockchain Epidemic Consensus Protocol (BECP), leverages viral communication to solve the decentralization-scalability trade-off.
Formalizing Blockchain Incentive Compatibility through New Economic Primitives
The research defines MMIC and OCA-proofness, new game-theoretic primitives that formally analyze and secure transaction fee mechanisms against collusion.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
