Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Multi-Party Computation Circumvents Impossibility in Decentralized Mechanism Design for Fair Fees
Cryptographic Multi-Party Computation enables collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms, transforming a game-theoretic impossibility into a secure computation problem.
Threshold Encryption Secures Transaction Ordering Fairness and Mitigates Extractable Value
Threshold encryption decouples transaction submission from execution, forcing validator collusion to extract MEV, thereby enforcing order fairness.
Hierarchical Aggregate VRFs Decouple Consensus Scalability from Overhead
Introducing Hierarchical Aggregate Verifiable Random Functions (HAVRFs), a primitive that compresses multiple VRF proofs into a single, constant-size proof, enabling scalable and secure committee-based consensus.
Decentralized Proving Markets Secure Verifiable Computation Outsourcing Efficiency
This paper introduces a mechanism design framework for a decentralized proving market, transforming zero-knowledge proof generation into a competitive, economically efficient service.
Decentralized ZK-Rollups Achieve Data Availability and MEV Resistance
A novel L2 architecture separates node roles and uses a Proof of Luck mechanism to secure decentralization and prevent transaction reordering attacks.
Cryptographic Whistleblowing Secures Protocols against Smart Collusion Incentives
This research introduces Cryptographic Whistleblowing, a mechanism design primitive that uses provable on-chain penalties to enforce honesty against financially rational colluders.
Cryptographic Primitives Secure Decentralization and Data Availability for Rollups
New cryptographic primitives like Proof of Luck and Proof of Download secure Layer 2 decentralization and data integrity, fundamentally mitigating MEV and data withholding.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Decentralized Mechanism Design Impossibility and Cryptographic Circumvention
This research reveals the fundamental impossibility of fully collusion-resistant blockchain transaction mechanisms, proposing cryptographic techniques to build robust alternatives.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees
This research designs a truthful, collusion-proof transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner revenue and network stability through a novel Bayesian approach.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees and Miner Revenue
This research pioneers a Bayesian approach to blockchain transaction fees, overcoming prior incentive limitations and ensuring sustainable miner compensation.
Blockchain Mechanism Design: Unique Challenges and Strategic Imperatives
New research illuminates the inherent complexities of designing incentive mechanisms within permissionless blockchains, revealing novel challenges in economic coordination and protocol security.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Truthfulness
This research leverages Bayesian game theory to design blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, overcoming prior limitations to enable non-zero miner revenue while maintaining user truthfulness.
Fine-Grained Functional Encryption with Revocation Secures Dynamic Data Access
A novel functional encryption scheme enables precise access control and dynamic revocation over encrypted data, critical for privacy in evolving systems like healthcare.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, leveraging Bayesian game theory, to ensure miner revenue and user truthfulness, resolving a critical blockchain economic dilemma.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Yields Truthful, Collusion-Proof Blockchain Transaction Fees
This research introduces an auxiliary mechanism method to design transaction fee mechanisms that overcome existing impossibility results, enabling positive miner revenue while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties in blockchain systems.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue with Truthful Fees
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, overcoming a foundational impossibility theorem to ensure miner incentives and user truthfulness in blockchain networks.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Incentives
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner profitability and user truthfulness by leveraging Bayesian game theory.
