Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Multi-Party Computation Circumvents Impossibility in Decentralized Mechanism Design for Fair Fees
Cryptographic Multi-Party Computation enables collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms, transforming a game-theoretic impossibility into a secure computation problem.
Threshold Encryption Secures Transaction Ordering Fairness and Mitigates Extractable Value
Threshold encryption decouples transaction submission from execution, forcing validator collusion to extract MEV, thereby enforcing order fairness.
Hierarchical Aggregate VRFs Decouple Consensus Scalability from Overhead
Introducing Hierarchical Aggregate Verifiable Random Functions (HAVRFs), a primitive that compresses multiple VRF proofs into a single, constant-size proof, enabling scalable and secure committee-based consensus.
Decentralized Proving Markets Secure Verifiable Computation Outsourcing Efficiency
This paper introduces a mechanism design framework for a decentralized proving market, transforming zero-knowledge proof generation into a competitive, economically efficient service.
Decentralized ZK-Rollups Achieve Data Availability and MEV Resistance
A novel L2 architecture separates node roles and uses a Proof of Luck mechanism to secure decentralization and prevent transaction reordering attacks.
Cryptographic Whistleblowing Secures Protocols against Smart Collusion Incentives
This research introduces Cryptographic Whistleblowing, a mechanism design primitive that uses provable on-chain penalties to enforce honesty against financially rational colluders.
Cryptographic Primitives Secure Decentralization and Data Availability for Rollups
New cryptographic primitives like Proof of Luck and Proof of Download secure Layer 2 decentralization and data integrity, fundamentally mitigating MEV and data withholding.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
