Quantifying the Compromise between Neutrality and Compliance in Proof-of-Stake
New analysis quantifies how Proposer-Builder Separation and MEV incentives compromise both censorship resistance and regulatory compliance.
Verifiable Randomness Algorithm Secures Fair Unbiased Decentralized Consensus
Introducing BCPVRNG-SC, a dual-PRNG mechanism that embeds verifiable randomness into the ledger, structurally eliminating proposer bias and enhancing network fairness.
Distributed Verifiable Random Functions Secure Decentralized Randomness Generation Trustlessly
Integrating threshold cryptography and zk-SNARKs into a Distributed Verifiable Random Function creates a foundational, unbiasable randomness primitive essential for secure PoS and sharding.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful, Fork-Free Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
This mechanism design breakthrough uses revelation principles to create a unique, truthful equilibrium, fundamentally securing PoS against adversarial block proposal.
Formalizing Proof-of-Stake Incentive Compatibility and Forking Attack Risk
Game theory proves the fork-choice rule is only eventually incentive-compatible, exposing a rational forking risk under network synchrony shifts.
Proof-of-Encryption Cryptographically Eliminates MEV at the Consensus Layer
The new Proof-of-Encryption consensus, powered by Threshold Encryption, cryptographically eliminates MEV by keeping transactions private until finality.
Practical Lattice-Based Single Secret Leader Election Secures Post-Quantum Consensus
Qelect introduces the first practical constant-round post-quantum SSLE using RLWE and tFHE, securing Proof-of-Stake against quantum adversaries.
Formalizing MEV for Provable Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling formal security proofs for blockchain protocols and smart contracts.