Opening-Consistent IOPs Enable Trustless Erasure Code Commitments
This research introduces Erasure Code Commitments, a new primitive constructed via a novel IOP compiler, solving data availability without a trusted setup or high overhead.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
Formalizing Economic Security with Expensive to Attack in Absence of Collapse
A new EAAC property formally quantifies the economic security of consensus, proving that targeted slashing is only possible under strong synchronous network assumptions.
Game Theory and C-NORM Metric Secure Decentralized Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping
Foundational game-theoretic analysis introduces C-NORM, a novel centralization metric, proving ideal Proof-of-Stake bootstrapping protocols must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Formalizing MEV for Provably Secure Blockchain Design
A new formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value provides foundational tools for designing blockchains resilient to economic manipulation.
Formalizing Universal Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous, universal definition of Maximal Extractable Value, quantifying maximum adversarial gain to fortify blockchain security.
Universal MEV Formalization Provides Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchain Security
This research introduces a rigorous, game-theoretic framework for Universal MEV, enabling formal analysis of contract vulnerabilities and advancing blockchain security.
Willchain: Secure, Private, Self-Executing Digital Estate Planning
Willchain introduces a decentralized protocol for digital estate planning, leveraging novel cryptographic primitives to ensure private, self-executing asset distribution without fund movement.
AI Enhances Oracle Reliability, Not Eliminates Trust
AI techniques can augment blockchain oracle systems by improving data quality and resilience, but they cannot fundamentally resolve the inherent trust problem of off-chain data integration.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Enhanced Blockchain Security and Decentralization
This research establishes a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), providing a foundational model to prove security against economic attacks that undermine blockchain integrity.
Economic Security Limits in Permissionless Consensus Protocols
This research establishes a foundational mathematical framework to rigorously assess the economic security of permissionless blockchain consensus, enabling the design of more resilient protocols.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Robust Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous theoretical framework for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.
Formalizing MEV: Abstract Model for Blockchain Economic Attacks
This research establishes a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value, providing a rigorous abstract model for understanding and mitigating blockchain economic attacks.
Formal MEV Theory for Blockchain Security Analysis
This research establishes a foundational, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling rigorous security proofs and advancing blockchain integrity.
SAKA: A Novel MEV-Resistant Transaction Fee Mechanism
This research introduces the SAKA mechanism, a sybil-proof, incentive-compatible transaction fee design that mitigates MEV's negative impact on blockchain welfare.
Formalizing MEV: A Foundational Theory for Blockchain Security
Researchers introduce a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value, providing a rigorous framework to understand and counter economic attacks in decentralized systems.
Formally Defining Economic Security for Permissionless Consensus
This research establishes a foundational framework for analyzing the economic security of blockchain consensus protocols, quantifying attack costs to enable more robust designs.
Game Theory Models MEV Dynamics and Mitigation Strategies
This research formally models MEV as a multi-stage game, revealing competitive dynamics that degrade welfare and quantifies mitigation through commit-reveal schemes.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Incentives
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner profitability and user truthfulness by leveraging Bayesian game theory.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security Proofs
This research establishes a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) through an abstract blockchain model, enabling rigorous security proofs against economic attacks.
