Formal MEV Theory for Blockchain Security Analysis

This research establishes a foundational, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling rigorous security proofs and advancing blockchain integrity.
SAKA: A Novel MEV-Resistant Transaction Fee Mechanism

This research introduces the SAKA mechanism, a sybil-proof, incentive-compatible transaction fee design that mitigates MEV's negative impact on blockchain welfare.
Formalizing MEV: A Foundational Theory for Blockchain Security

This research establishes a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value, providing a robust framework for understanding and mitigating economic attacks on blockchains.
Formally Defining Economic Security for Permissionless Consensus

This research establishes a foundational framework for analyzing the economic security of blockchain consensus protocols, quantifying attack costs to enable more robust designs.
Game Theory Models MEV Dynamics and Mitigation Strategies

This research formally models MEV as a multi-stage game, revealing competitive dynamics that degrade welfare and quantifies mitigation through commit-reveal schemes.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Incentives

This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner profitability and user truthfulness by leveraging Bayesian game theory.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security Proofs

This research establishes a rigorous, abstract theory of MEV, enabling formal security proofs against economic attacks that exploit transaction ordering.