Zero-Knowledge Commitment Enables Private Verifiable Mechanism Design
Cryptography now allows a mechanism designer to prove a system's fairness and incentive compatibility without revealing its private economic rules, securing hidden yet verifiable contracts.
MEV Uncertainty Principles Quantify Transaction Ordering Trade-Offs for Decentralized Fairness
New uncertainty principles establish a fundamental, quantifiable trade-off between validator transaction ordering freedom and user economic payoff complexity.
Erasure Code Commitments Enforce Data Availability Consistency
This new cryptographic primitive enforces that committed data is a valid code word, fundamentally securing data availability sampling protocols against malicious data encoding.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Opening-Consistent IOPs Enable Trustless Erasure Code Commitments
This research introduces Erasure Code Commitments, a new primitive constructed via a novel IOP compiler, solving data availability without a trusted setup or high overhead.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
Formalizing Economic Security with Expensive to Attack in Absence of Collapse
A new EAAC property formally quantifies the economic security of consensus, proving that targeted slashing is only possible under strong synchronous network assumptions.
