Cryptographic Fairness: Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism for MEV-Resistant Execution
A Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism cryptographically enforces transaction fairness, eliminating front-running by decoupling ordering from block production.
Decoupling Fair Ordering from Consensus Unlocks High-Performance BFT
SpeedyFair decouples transaction ordering from consensus, using parallel processing to achieve a 1.5×-2.45× throughput increase over state-of-the-art fair ordering protocols.
Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in State Replication
By mapping the "equal opportunity" fairness problem to Differential Privacy, this research unlocks a new class of provably fair, bias-resistant transaction ordering mechanisms.
Differential Privacy Guarantees Fair Transaction Ordering in Blockchains
Foundational research establishes a surprising link: any Differential Privacy mechanism can be repurposed to eliminate algorithmic bias in transaction ordering, providing a provable defense against MEV.
