Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
        
        Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
        
        Mechanism Design Enhances Blockchain Consensus Truthfulness and Scalability
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research introduces novel mechanism design principles to fortify blockchain consensus, ensuring truthful block proposals and mitigating fork-related coordination failures.
        
        Decentralized Identity and Cryptography Reshape Digital Identity Management for Enhanced Control
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        Decentralized identity, powered by blockchain and cryptography, empowers individuals with self-sovereign control over their digital data, revolutionizing security and global accessibility.
