Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
Decentralized Autonomous Verification Fortifies DAO Security with Advanced Cryptography
DAVe integrates ZKPs, HE, and consensus to create a resilient, multi-layered security framework, safeguarding DAO governance integrity
Layered MEV Mitigation Ensures Transaction Fairness via Decentralized Auction Ordering
FairFlow introduces a layered protocol using decentralized auctions and randomized ordering to mitigate MEV, ensuring equitable and private transaction execution.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
Mechanism Design Enhances Blockchain Consensus Truthfulness and Scalability
This research introduces novel mechanism design principles to fortify blockchain consensus, ensuring truthful block proposals and mitigating fork-related coordination failures.
Decentralized Identity and Cryptography Reshape Digital Identity Management for Enhanced Control
Decentralized identity, powered by blockchain and cryptography, empowers individuals with self-sovereign control over their digital data, revolutionizing security and global accessibility.
