Optimal Asynchronous Consensus Resilience Using Complexity-Efficient Hash-Based Agreement
A new hash-based Multi-Valued Byzantine Agreement protocol achieves near-optimal fault tolerance with constant time complexity, enabling robust asynchronous consensus.
Automated Liveness Verification Reduces Proof Burden for Distributed Protocols
LVR soundly reduces complex liveness proofs to simpler safety property checks using automated ranking function synthesis, accelerating foundational protocol verification.
Improved Batched Threshold Encryption Secures Private Transaction Ordering
This cryptographic upgrade to Batched Threshold Encryption enables scalable, private mempools, fundamentally eliminating front-running MEV.
Formalizing Accountable Liveness for Provable Consensus Security and Validator Punishment
Introducing Accountable Liveness and the $x$-partially-synchronous model to formally identify and punish consensus-stalling nodes, strengthening BFT security.
Mechanism Design Enforces Truthful Proof-of-Stake Consensus and Scalability
A new revelation mechanism, triggered by consensus disputes, mathematically enforces truthful block proposals to enhance Proof-of-Stake security and throughput.
Batch-Updatable Vector Commitments Enable Efficient Stateless Blockchain Architecture
Cauchyproofs introduces a quasi-linear batch-updatable vector commitment, solving the critical state proof maintenance bottleneck for practical stateless chains.
Thetacrypt Unifies Distributed Threshold Cryptography for Robust Blockchain Services
Thetacrypt introduces a unified distributed service architecture for threshold cryptography, enabling accurate performance evaluation and robust decentralized trust protocols.
Decentralized Prover Selection Secures Zero-Knowledge Rollup Censorship Resistance
A commitment auction paired with a VDF lottery decentralizes proof generation, ensuring economic efficiency and censorship resistance for Layer 2 systems.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Secure Private Verifiable Mechanism Design
This framework uses zero-knowledge proofs to allow mechanism designers to commit to secret rules while players verify incentive compatibility without a mediator.
