Bayesian Mechanism Breaks Zero-Revenue Barrier for Collusion-Proof Fees
By shifting to a Bayesian-Nash model, a novel auxiliary mechanism achieves collusion-proofness and constant-factor optimal miner revenue.
Novel Auxiliary Mechanism Design Achieves Truthfulness, Collusion-Proofness, and Non-Zero Miner Revenue
By shifting from dominant to Bayesian incentive compatibility, this new auxiliary mechanism method breaks the zero-revenue barrier for secure transaction fee design.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
