Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Networks
Mechanism design introduces revelation games to Proof-of-Stake, ensuring a unique truthful equilibrium that fundamentally mitigates coordination failures and dishonest forks.
Dynamic Slashing Secures Proof-of-Stake against Stake Centralization
A new mechanism dynamically scales slashing penalties by stake concentration, creating a self-regulating security equilibrium that disincentivizes validator centralization.
Formalizing Shared Security Risk via Adaptive Slashing Mechanisms
Adaptive Slashing Bonds formally quantify systemic risk in shared security protocols, enabling provably secure restaking architectures.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Biomimetic Consensus Achieves Asymmetric Sybil Resistance Surpassing Proof-of-Stake Security
Proof-of-Balance, a biomimetic asymmetric Sybil-resistance mechanism, fundamentally redesigns consensus to achieve a four-order-of-magnitude security increase.
Non-Linear Stake Weighting Enhances Proof-of-Stake Decentralization and Security
New non-linear stake weighting models diminish the marginal utility of large pools, structurally incentivizing stake distribution for robust decentralization.
New AMM Mechanism Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to guarantee arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation to the application layer.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Accountable Finality Signatures Secure Proof-of-Stake against Equivocation
A novel Accountable Finality Signature primitive transforms probabilistic Proof-of-Stake safety into mathematically provable, self-slashing accountability.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A novel revelation mechanism uses game theory to guarantee truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, simplifying consensus and boosting scalability.
Three-Slot Finality Protocol Overcomes Consensus Latency and MEV Vulnerability
By integrating a partially synchronous finality gadget with dynamically available consensus, this protocol achieves transaction finality in three slots, fundamentally securing the chain against reorganization risks.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
Revelation Mechanisms Secure Consensus against Untruthful Block Proposals
Mechanism design principles construct a revelation mechanism for Proof-of-Stake, establishing a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that compels validators to propose truthful blocks.
EigenLayer Mainnet Activates Native Restaking Unifying Ethereum Security Capital
The launch transforms staked ETH into a composable security primitive, dramatically lowering the trust-bootstrapping cost for new decentralized services.
Mechanism Design Balances Decentralization and Efficiency in Verifiable Computation
New game-theoretic mechanisms characterize the decentralization-efficiency trade-off, enabling provably optimal design for verifiable computation markets.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Decentralized Proving Markets Secure Verifiable Computation Outsourcing Efficiency
This paper introduces a mechanism design framework for a decentralized proving market, transforming zero-knowledge proof generation into a competitive, economically efficient service.
Formalizing Economic Security with Expensive to Attack in Absence of Collapse
A new EAAC property formally quantifies the economic security of consensus, proving that targeted slashing is only possible under strong synchronous network assumptions.
Concurrent Proposers and Conditional Tips Enforce Economic Censorship Resistance
Introducing conditional tips across concurrent block proposers creates a mechanism design solution, establishing a Proposer's Dilemma to enforce timely transaction inclusion.
Adaptive Delegation Weighting Mitigates Proof-of-Stake Centralization Risk
Adaptive Delegation Weighting employs a non-linear reward function to economically disincentivize stake concentration, fundamentally securing DPoS decentralization.
Mechanism Design Characterizes Decentralized Verifiable Computation Incentives
This research fundamentally characterizes incentive mechanisms for verifiable computation, balancing decentralization against execution efficiency in strategic environments.
