Economic security refers to the condition of having stable income or other resources to support a standard of living. In the context of digital assets, this can relate to the perceived stability, store of value properties, or wealth generation potential offered by certain cryptocurrencies or blockchain-based financial instruments. It also pertains to the broader financial system’s resilience.
Context
Discussions on economic security in relation to digital assets often focus on their potential to offer alternative stores of value or facilitate financial inclusion, particularly in regions with unstable traditional economies. Conversely, concerns are raised about volatility, speculative risks, and the potential for illicit use. Future developments will likely involve greater integration of digital assets into mainstream financial planning and a clearer understanding of their role in global economic stability.
A novel ticketing mechanism aims to integrate Maximal Extractable Value directly into the Ethereum protocol, fostering fairer distribution and network robustness.
This research establishes a foundational framework for analyzing the economic security of blockchain consensus protocols, quantifying attack costs to enable more robust designs.
This research introduces "Execution Tickets," a novel mechanism to integrate and redistribute Maximal Extractable Value directly within the Ethereum protocol, enhancing network fairness and security.
This research establishes a foundational mathematical framework to rigorously assess the economic security of permissionless blockchain consensus, enabling the design of more resilient protocols.
This research reveals critical vulnerabilities in existing Proof-of-Stake penalty mechanisms, proposing a formal framework to design provably robust slashing conditions.
This research introduces a novel batch-processing mechanism for Automated Market Makers, fundamentally mitigating Miner Extractable Value and fostering equitable transaction execution.
This research introduces a novel economic security framework, the EAAC property, to rigorously quantify attack costs in permissionless blockchains, ensuring protocol resilience.
Pulsar introduces a novel density-based chain selection rule, enhancing Proof of Stake security and enabling robust sidechain interoperability with Proof of Work systems.
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism for leaderless blockchains, ensuring block producer incentives and enhancing network efficiency.
This research formalizes economic security for permissionless consensus, demonstrating how slashing mechanisms in Proof-of-Stake can enhance network resilience.
This research introduces novel mechanism design principles to fortify blockchain consensus, ensuring truthful block proposals and mitigating fork-related coordination failures.
This research introduces a formal, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.
This research designs transaction fee mechanisms to economically incentivize multiple block proposers, fundamentally countering censorship and bribery in decentralized networks.
A novel mechanism, Proposer-Builder Separation, disentangles block construction from proposal, enhancing blockchain decentralization and censorship resistance.
This research introduces an auction mechanism for transaction time advantage, fundamentally reshaping MEV extraction strategies and enabling AMMs to reclaim value.
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
A formal proof establishes that no single slashing mechanism can simultaneously deter both single and multi-identity Sybil attacks, revealing a foundational trade-off in economic security.
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
A new Decoupled Execution and Ordering framework enforces fair sequencing by committing to order before content is visible, neutralizing predatory MEV.
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