Decoupling Transaction Ordering from Execution Is the Key to Systemic MEV Mitigation
A new Decoupled Execution and Ordering framework enforces fair sequencing by committing to order before content is visible, neutralizing predatory MEV.
Threshold Cryptography Enforces Fair Transaction Ordering Mitigating MEV
A distributed threshold cryptosystem decouples transaction ordering from content knowledge, mathematically eliminating frontrunning risk and centralizing MEV incentives.
Game Theory Secures Oracle Data Quality and Node Incentives
A Stackelberg game model resolves the oracle problem's incentive conflict, creating an equilibrium for secure, high-quality decentralized price feeds.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Restaking Sybil-Proofness: An Impossibility Theorem Limits Slashing Mechanisms
A formal proof establishes that no single slashing mechanism can simultaneously deter both single and multi-identity Sybil attacks, revealing a foundational trade-off in economic security.
Time-Averaged Commitment Smooths MEV Auctions, Decentralizing Transaction Ordering
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
