EigenLayer Mainnet Activates Native Restaking Unifying Ethereum Security Capital
The launch transforms staked ETH into a composable security primitive, dramatically lowering the trust-bootstrapping cost for new decentralized services.
Mechanism Design Balances Decentralization and Efficiency in Verifiable Computation
New game-theoretic mechanisms characterize the decentralization-efficiency trade-off, enabling provably optimal design for verifiable computation markets.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Decentralized Proving Markets Secure Verifiable Computation Outsourcing Efficiency
This paper introduces a mechanism design framework for a decentralized proving market, transforming zero-knowledge proof generation into a competitive, economically efficient service.
Formalizing Economic Security with Expensive to Attack in Absence of Collapse
A new EAAC property formally quantifies the economic security of consensus, proving that targeted slashing is only possible under strong synchronous network assumptions.
Formal MEV Theory Enables Provable Security against Transaction Reordering Attacks
A formal, abstract MEV theory rigorously defines adversarial gain via knowledge axiomatization, enabling proofs of smart contract security.
Concurrent Proposers and Conditional Tips Enforce Economic Censorship Resistance
Introducing conditional tips across concurrent block proposers creates a mechanism design solution, establishing a Proposer's Dilemma to enforce timely transaction inclusion.
Adaptive Delegation Weighting Mitigates Proof-of-Stake Centralization Risk
Adaptive Delegation Weighting employs a non-linear reward function to economically disincentivize stake concentration, fundamentally securing DPoS decentralization.
Mechanism Design Characterizes Decentralized Verifiable Computation Incentives
This research fundamentally characterizes incentive mechanisms for verifiable computation, balancing decentralization against execution efficiency in strategic environments.
