Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Accountable Finality Signatures Secure Proof-of-Stake against Equivocation
A novel Accountable Finality Signature primitive transforms probabilistic Proof-of-Stake safety into mathematically provable, self-slashing accountability.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A novel revelation mechanism uses game theory to guarantee truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, simplifying consensus and boosting scalability.
Three-Slot Finality Protocol Overcomes Consensus Latency and MEV Vulnerability
By integrating a partially synchronous finality gadget with dynamically available consensus, this protocol achieves transaction finality in three slots, fundamentally securing the chain against reorganization risks.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
