Proof of Compute Transforms Verifiable Work into a Consensus Primitive
Proof of Compute re-engineers consensus by rewarding verifiable ZK computation, fundamentally transforming computational work into a yield-bearing asset.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Networks
Mechanism design introduces revelation games to Proof-of-Stake, ensuring a unique truthful equilibrium that fundamentally mitigates coordination failures and dishonest forks.
Dynamic Slashing Secures Proof-of-Stake against Stake Centralization
A new mechanism dynamically scales slashing penalties by stake concentration, creating a self-regulating security equilibrium that disincentivizes validator centralization.
Formalizing Shared Security Risk via Adaptive Slashing Mechanisms
Adaptive Slashing Bonds formally quantify systemic risk in shared security protocols, enabling provably secure restaking architectures.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Biomimetic Consensus Achieves Asymmetric Sybil Resistance Surpassing Proof-of-Stake Security
Proof-of-Balance, a biomimetic asymmetric Sybil-resistance mechanism, fundamentally redesigns consensus to achieve a four-order-of-magnitude security increase.
Non-Linear Stake Weighting Enhances Proof-of-Stake Decentralization and Security
New non-linear stake weighting models diminish the marginal utility of large pools, structurally incentivizing stake distribution for robust decentralization.
