Six Trust Primitives Formalize Security for the Autonomous Agentic Web
A new framework classifies inter-agent trust into six primitives—from cryptographic proof to economic stake—enabling secure, scalable AI agent protocols.
Verifiable Delay Functions Cryptographically Eliminate Frontrunning and Transaction Ordering Attacks
Verifiable Delay Functions Cryptographically Eliminate Frontrunning and Transaction Ordering Attacks
The FIRST framework uses Verifiable Delay Functions to enforce a mandatory pre-execution time lock, making transaction frontrunning probabilistically impossible.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
A game-theoretic revelation mechanism, triggered by block disputes, establishes a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, eliminating dishonest forks and enhancing PoS security.
Mechanism Design Revelation Ensures Truthful Proof-of-Stake Consensus
Applying economic revelation mechanisms to Proof-of-Stake protocols forces validators' self-interest to align with network truthfulness, fundamentally securing consensus.
Decoupling Prover and Sequencer Roles for Decentralized ZK Rollups
A new Prover-Validator Separation mechanism uses a sealed-bid auction to decentralize zero-knowledge proof generation, mitigating rollup centralization and MEV risk.
Protected Order Flow Secures Transactions, Aligning Validator Incentives
PROF introduces an incentive-compatible mechanism that enforces private transaction ordering within PBS, mitigating harmful MEV while preserving validator profitability.
Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism Achieves Optimal Miner Revenue and Strategy-Proofness
A new Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism leverages a soft second-price auction to achieve optimal miner revenue while preserving strategy-proofness.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Based Sequencing Leverages L1 Proposers for Credibly Neutral Rollup Transaction Ordering
Based sequencing delegates L2 ordering to L1 validators via specialized gateways and economic slashing, ensuring credibly neutral, high-performance rollups.
