Verifiable Pseudorandom Functions Cryptographically Enforce Fair Transaction Ordering
VPFs are a new primitive that cryptographically binds block producers to a fair, unpredictable transaction order, eliminating MEV frontrunning risk.
Batch-Processing Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Arbitrage and MEV Opportunities
This application-layer mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience by batching all transactions, fundamentally removing miner extractable value from AMMs.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Secures Arbitrage-Resilient Decentralized Finance
By shifting MEV mitigation to the AMM's core logic, this mechanism guarantees risk-free profit elimination and truthful user behavior under fair sequencing.
Cryptographic Fairness: Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism for MEV-Resistant Execution
A Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism cryptographically enforces transaction fairness, eliminating front-running by decoupling ordering from block production.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
Decoupling Transaction Ordering from Execution Is the Key to Systemic MEV Mitigation
A new Decoupled Execution and Ordering framework enforces fair sequencing by committing to order before content is visible, neutralizing predatory MEV.
Systematic Fair Ordering Consensus Mitigates MEV Exploitation and Protocol Latency
A systematic knowledge framework and latency-optimized protocol design fundamentally advance fair transaction ordering, mitigating Maximal Extractable Value.
