Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, achieves strongly incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation for multi-proposer consensus, securing welfare.
Strongly BPIC Mechanism Secures Leaderless DAG Consensus Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic model and First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism solves transaction fee alignment in leaderless DAG protocols.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanisms with Strong Incentives
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, solves incentive alignment for block producers in leaderless blockchains, enabling robust, efficient transaction fee markets.
