Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
        
        Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
        
        Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanisms with Strong Incentives
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, solves incentive alignment for block producers in leaderless blockchains, enabling robust, efficient transaction fee markets.
