Differential Privacy Guarantees Fair Transaction Ordering in Blockchains
Foundational research proves Differential Privacy mechanisms eliminate algorithmic bias, ensuring equal opportunity for all transactions in State Machine Replication.
Distributed Threshold Encryption Mitigates MEV for Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Distributed threshold encryption conceals transaction content from block producers, enforcing fair ordering and eliminating front-running opportunities.
Application Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Maximal Extractable Value
This mechanism design breakthrough achieves strategy proofness for AMMs by batch-processing transactions to maintain a constant potential function, mitigating MEV.
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Mechanism Design Provides Mitigation
The foundational game-theoretic model establishes that MEV extraction is a Bertrand competition, requiring mechanism design solutions like commit-reveal to restore system welfare.
Ethereum Transaction Ordering Exploited via MEV-Boost Sandwich Attack
MEV-Boost manipulation enables transaction sandwiching, allowing attackers to front-run user swaps and extract millions in capital from order flow.
Base Token Launch Exploited by Same-Block Snipers Securing 26 Percent Supply
The exploitation of 200-millisecond block times via high-fee bidding establishes an asymmetric risk profile for all public token launches.
Formalizing MEV as a Game to Quantify Mitigation Strategies
Game theory formalizes the MEV supply chain, proving unconstrained transaction ordering creates a systemic welfare loss, unlocking quantified mitigation via mechanism design.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Elimination and Strategy Proofness
A novel AMM mechanism batch-processes transactions using a constant potential function, shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to application logic for provable incentive compatibility.
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Proposes Cryptographic Mitigation Mechanisms
Formalizing MEV extraction as a three-stage game of incomplete information proves that Bertrand-style competition harms system welfare, necessitating cryptographic transaction ordering.
