Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Game Theory and C-NORM Metric Secure Decentralized Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping
Foundational game-theoretic analysis introduces C-NORM, a novel centralization metric, proving ideal Proof-of-Stake bootstrapping protocols must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Incentive Compatibility
A new AMM mechanism ensures provable incentive compatibility by maintaining a constant potential function, fundamentally eliminating application-layer MEV exploitation.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Elevates Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
This research redefines blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, achieving collusion-proofness and positive miner revenue through Bayesian game theory.
