Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Incentive Compatibility
A new AMM mechanism ensures provable incentive compatibility by maintaining a constant potential function, fundamentally eliminating application-layer MEV exploitation.
Game Theory and C-NORM Metric Secure Decentralized Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping
Foundational game-theoretic analysis introduces C-NORM, a novel centralization metric, proving ideal Proof-of-Stake bootstrapping protocols must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Protected Order Flow System Limits Harmful MEV in Builder-Proposer Separation
PROF introduces a mechanism to minimize adversarial MEV in Proposer-Builder Separation, transcending the tradeoff between user protection and transaction inclusion rate.
Protocol Immutability Is Foundational for Rational Economic Behavior
Integrating Austrian economics and game theory reveals that protocol mutability elevates time preference, destabilizing cooperative equilibria and incentivizing rent-seeking over rational investment.
Formalizing Proof-of-Stake Incentive Compatibility and Forking Attack Risk
Game theory proves the fork-choice rule is only eventually incentive-compatible, exposing a rational forking risk under network synchrony shifts.
Novel Auxiliary Mechanism Design Achieves Truthfulness, Collusion-Proofness, and Non-Zero Miner Revenue
By shifting from dominant to Bayesian incentive compatibility, this new auxiliary mechanism method breaks the zero-revenue barrier for secure transaction fee design.
C-NORM Metric Formalizes Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping Decentralization
Game theory defines ideal PoS bootstrapping with C-NORM, proving existing airdrop methods centralize and validating PoW-based stake distribution.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV and Ensures Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism design achieves provable arbitrage resilience and strategy proofness, shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to the application layer.
