Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Decouple Commitment from Disclosure in Protocol Design
Research pioneers a cryptographic primitive that proves a mechanism's incentive properties and execution correctness without revealing its secret rules.
Proposer-Builder Separation Shifts Centralization to Block Builders
Mathematical models quantify how Proposer-Builder Separation equalizes validator rewards but concentrates power in a few skilled block builders, creating a Proof-of-MEV paradigm.
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence-Proof Fee Mechanisms via a Burn Identity
Foundational mechanism design proves that off-chain influence-proof transaction fees are mathematically equivalent to a novel burn identity, securing transaction ordering.
Adjustable Block Size Mechanism Binds Miner Selfishness for Social Welfare
A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and eliminates social welfare loss from selfish miners in decentralized order books, achieving optimal outcomes.
Differential Privacy Guarantees Provable Transaction Ordering Fairness in Distributed Systems
By formally linking Differential Privacy to transaction ordering, this research provides a general, quantifiable cryptographic primitive to eliminate algorithmic bias and mitigate MEV.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates Miner Arbitrage and Ensures Strategy-Proof AMMs
A new AMM mechanism uses batch processing and a constant potential function to achieve provable strategy-proofness, eliminating MEV at the application layer.
Mechanism Design Incentivizes Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
A new revelation mechanism for Proof-of-Stake leverages staked assets to create a unique equilibrium, compelling validators to propose truthful blocks and mitigate forks.
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Proposes Cryptographic Mitigation Mechanisms
Formalizing MEV extraction as a three-stage game of incomplete information proves that Bertrand-style competition harms system welfare, necessitating cryptographic transaction ordering.
