Formal MEV Theory Establishes Security Proofs for Blockchain Transaction Ordering
A formal, abstract theory of Maximal Extractable Value is now established, providing the foundational model for provably MEV-secure blockchain architectures.
On-Chain Randomness Enables Fair Transaction Inclusion without Miner Manipulation
Introducing rTFM, a mechanism using on-chain randomness to decouple miner incentives from fair transaction inclusion, unlocking equitable blockspace access.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Blockchain Protocols with Shared Fee Incentives
Proposes FPA-EQ, the first TFM for multi-proposer systems, achieving Strongly BPIC to align block producer incentives and maximize welfare.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful, Fork-Free Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
This mechanism design breakthrough uses revelation principles to create a unique, truthful equilibrium, fundamentally securing PoS against adversarial block proposal.
Game-Theoretic Incentives Guarantee Provably Uniform Decentralized Randomness
A new Randomness Incentive Game (RIG) establishes a Nash Equilibrium where participants are compelled to submit provably uniform inputs, securing all decentralized randomness protocols.
