Zero-Knowledge Commitment Secures Private Mechanism Design and Verifiable Incentives
Cryptographic proofs enable a party to commit to a hidden mechanism while verifiably guaranteeing its incentive properties, eliminating trusted mediators.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design Commitment
This framework leverages ZKPs to let parties commit to and run complex economic mechanisms privately, ensuring verifiable incentive compatibility without a trusted third party.
Decentralized Order Flow Auction Secures Transaction Ordering Neutrality
A new mechanism design decentralizes block construction, using cryptographic commitments to enforce fair, censorship-resistant transaction ordering.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Strategy-Proof Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
A novel mechanism design uses staked assets to cryptoeconomically guarantee validator honesty, solving the foundational problem of fork coordination and untruthful block proposals.
Active Block Producer Model Fundamentally Limits Transaction Fee Mechanism Welfare
The SAKA mechanism is a novel game-theoretic solution that achieves incentive compatibility across users and block producers while guaranteeing half of the maximum social welfare.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
A game-theoretic revelation mechanism, triggered by block disputes, establishes a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, eliminating dishonest forks and enhancing PoS security.
Level-K Game Theory Secures Consensus against Bounded Rationality Assumptions
Introducing a new consensus mechanism that models validator behavior using Level-k reasoning, guaranteeing stability beyond perfect rationality.
Formalizing Proposer-Builder Separation Guarantees Credibly Neutral Transaction Ordering
The introduction of a two-stage commit-reveal protocol for block construction cryptographically enforces builder neutrality, eliminating the proposer's censorship vector.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
