Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Systems
Game theory's revelation mechanisms enforce truthful block proposals in PoS, resolving disputes and fundamentally enhancing decentralized coordination.
Searcher-Auction Mechanism Solves Transaction Fee Incentive Impossibility
Mechanism design incorporating searchers is a theoretical necessity to achieve incentive-compatible transaction fee mechanisms and high social welfare simultaneously.
Active Block Producers Create Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible Fee Mechanisms
Formal analysis proves active block producers, driven by private MEV, fundamentally prevent simultaneous incentive-compatibility and welfare-maximization.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Secure Mechanism Design without Revealing Rules
A new cryptographic framework enables verifiable, private mechanism design by using zero-knowledge proofs to commit to rules without public disclosure, eliminating trusted mediators.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, achieves strongly incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation for multi-proposer consensus, securing welfare.
Dynamic MEV Rate Stabilizes Extractor and User Incentives
A novel EIP-1559-style mechanism dynamically regulates Maximal Extractable Value, balancing block producer compensation with overall network welfare.
Cryptographic Second Price Auction Resolves Decentralized Transaction Ordering Impossibility
The Cryptographic Second Price Auction uses encrypted bids to eliminate the miner's informational advantage, achieving a truly incentive-compatible, collusion-proof transaction ordering mechanism.
Formal AMM Mechanism Achieves Strategy-Proofness and Eliminates Miner Arbitrage Profit
A new AMM design uses a constant potential function to process batched transactions, formally eliminating miner arbitrage and ensuring application-layer strategy-proofness.
Financial Fairness Redefines Security for On-Chain Multi-Party Computation
Research introduces Financial Fairness, a new property for cryptographic penalty protocols, ensuring equal net present cost for all honest participants to secure economic rigor.
