Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Secure Private Verifiable Mechanism Design
This framework uses zero-knowledge proofs to allow mechanism designers to commit to secret rules while players verify incentive compatibility without a mediator.
Time-Bound Signatures Cryptographically Enforce Transaction Expiry to Mitigate MEV
TB-Sig embeds a block height expiry into Schnorr signatures, granting users temporal control over transactions to fundamentally constrain block producer MEV extraction.
Formalizing Restaking Security Prevents Weakest Link Attacks in Modular Blockchains
Game theory proves unified slashing logic (Model S) is the optimal defense against fragmented stake attacks, securing cross-protocol services.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Enforces Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A game-theoretic revelation mechanism creates a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium for validating nodes to propose truthful blocks, structurally mitigating dishonest forking risks.
MEV Uncertainty Principles Quantify Transaction Ordering Trade-Offs and Limits
New MEV uncertainty principles quantify the fundamental trade-off between transaction reordering freedom and user economic payoff complexity, proving no universal mitigation exists.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Challenges EIP-1559 and Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
This research introduces off-chain influence proofness, demonstrating EIP-1559's vulnerability to censorship threats and proving fundamental limits on TFM design.
Cornucopia Achieves Scalable Unbiasable Randomness Using Accumulators and Delay Functions
A new framework combines accumulators and VDFs with insertion security to create a scalable, unbiasable distributed randomness beacon for consensus.
Bayesian Mechanism Breaks Zero-Revenue Barrier for Collusion-Proof Fees
By shifting to a Bayesian-Nash model, a novel auxiliary mechanism achieves collusion-proofness and constant-factor optimal miner revenue.
