Time-Bound Schnorr Signatures Curb MEV, Restoring Transaction Predictability.
This research introduces time-bound Schnorr signatures, a cryptographic primitive that embeds an expiry block height directly into a transaction's signature, fundamentally altering MEV dynamics by restoring predictable transaction inclusion and reducing predatory extraction.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment, Verifiable Execution without Mediators
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing mechanisms privately, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable properties without disclosure.
Aggregating Node Preferences Enhances Byzantine Fault Tolerance in Blockchain Consensus
A novel PBFT algorithm allows nodes to express preferences, integrating incentive mechanisms and verifiable randomness to achieve robust multi-value consensus.
Private Mechanism Design through Zero-Knowledge Commitments
This research introduces a novel framework for private mechanism design, enabling verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive information or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Hidden Mechanisms with Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Private Verifiable Commitment
This research enables verifiable, private mechanism execution without mediators, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to conceal rules while ensuring compliance.
Formalizing Universal Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous, universal definition of Maximal Extractable Value, quantifying maximum adversarial gain to fortify blockchain security.
Private Mechanism Design with Zero-Knowledge Proofs Eliminates Trusted Mediators
This research introduces a novel framework for mechanism design, enabling private, verifiable execution of protocols without trusted third parties through advanced zero-knowledge proofs.
Mechanism Design Mitigates Selfish Miner Inefficiencies in Blockchain Order Books
A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and reduces social welfare loss from selfish miner behavior in blockchain order books, enhancing market efficiency.
Game Theory Models Cross-Chain MEV Exploits as Strategic, Zero-Sum Warfare.
This analysis models cross-chain MEV extraction during bridge exploits as strategic warfare, exposing zero-sum competition and profit concentration.
Decentralized Mechanism Design Impossibility and Cryptographic Circumvention
This research reveals the fundamental impossibility of fully collusion-resistant blockchain transaction mechanisms, proposing cryptographic techniques to build robust alternatives.
VeriLLM Enables Efficient, Secure, and Verifiable Decentralized LLM Inference
This research introduces a hybrid verification protocol for decentralized large language model inference, combining empirical checks with cryptographic guarantees to ensure output correctness with minimal overhead, thereby enabling trustworthy AI at scale.
Universal MEV Formalization Provides Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchain Security
This research introduces a rigorous, game-theoretic framework for Universal MEV, enabling formal analysis of contract vulnerabilities and advancing blockchain security.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment in Mechanism Design
This research introduces a framework for private mechanism design, allowing verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive details, thereby enhancing trust and efficiency in decentralized systems.
Game Theory Incentives Mitigate Malicious Blockchain Behavior
A novel graph-game theoretic model enhances blockchain security by designing incentives that enforce cooperative node behavior and deter malicious actions.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees and Miner Revenue
This research pioneers a Bayesian approach to blockchain transaction fees, overcoming prior incentive limitations and ensuring sustainable miner compensation.
Blockchain-Enabled Mechanisms Eliminate Trust for Fair Economic Systems
This research pioneers using blockchain for economic mechanisms, overcoming centralized trust vulnerabilities and ensuring auditability in resource allocation.
Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees: New Mechanism for Multi-Proposer Protocols
A novel game-theoretic model and FPA-EQ mechanism enable efficient, incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation in leaderless blockchains, crucial for scalable architectures.
Mechanism Design Ensures Truthful Blockchain Consensus, Enhancing Security and Scalability
This research leverages game-theoretic mechanism design to incentivize truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, fundamentally securing consensus and enabling scalable, fork-resistant blockchains.
Blockchain Mechanism Design: Unique Challenges and Strategic Imperatives
New research illuminates the inherent complexities of designing incentive mechanisms within permissionless blockchains, revealing novel challenges in economic coordination and protocol security.
Mechanism Design Enhances Blockchain Consensus Truthfulness and Scalability
This research introduces novel mechanism design principles to fortify blockchain consensus, ensuring truthful block proposals and mitigating fork-related coordination failures.
Formalizing MEV: Rigorous Model for Blockchain Economic Security
This research establishes a foundational theory of Maximal Extractable Value, enabling provable security against economic attacks in decentralized systems.
Game Theory Reveals Incentive-Driven Vulnerabilities in Blockchain Robustness.
This research unifies distributed systems and game theory to expose how rational validator incentives compromise Ethereum Proof-of-Stake safety and liveness, paving the way for resilient protocol design.
Absolute Commitments Enable Optimal MEV Extraction on Decentralized Exchanges
A novel attack leveraging absolute commitments allows adversaries to monopolize transaction fees, profoundly diminishing decentralized exchange utility.
New Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchains Optimizes Transaction Fees
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism for leaderless blockchains, ensuring block producer incentives and enhancing network efficiency.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Truthfulness
This research leverages Bayesian game theory to design blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, overcoming prior limitations to enable non-zero miner revenue while maintaining user truthfulness.
EarthOL: Verifiable Human Contributions Replace Blockchain Computational Waste.
EarthOL pioneers a consensus protocol, leveraging verifiable human contributions to supplant energy-intensive computation, fostering sustainable decentralized value.
Formalizing MEV: A Rigorous Abstract Model for Blockchain Security
This research introduces a formal, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling provable security against economic manipulation in blockchains.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, leveraging Bayesian game theory, to ensure miner revenue and user truthfulness, resolving a critical blockchain economic dilemma.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees
A novel first-price auction mechanism for leaderless blockchains ensures fair transaction fee distribution, fostering robust, decentralized block production.
