Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in State Replication
By mapping the "equal opportunity" fairness problem to Differential Privacy, this research unlocks a new class of provably fair, bias-resistant transaction ordering mechanisms.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A novel revelation mechanism uses game theory to guarantee truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, simplifying consensus and boosting scalability.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Verifiable, Hidden Economic Mechanisms without Trusted Mediators
Cryptographic commitments hide mechanism rules while zero-knowledge proofs verify incentive compatibility, unlocking private, trustless economic design.
Dynamic Mechanism Stabilizes MEV Sharing between Users and Block Producers
This dynamic mechanism, inspired by EIP-1559, enshrines a variable MEV extraction rate to formally balance user and validator incentives for system robustness.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Revelation Mechanisms Secure Consensus against Untruthful Block Proposals
Mechanism design principles construct a revelation mechanism for Proof-of-Stake, establishing a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that compels validators to propose truthful blocks.
Multi-Party Computation Circumvents Impossibility in Decentralized Mechanism Design for Fair Fees
Cryptographic Multi-Party Computation enables collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms, transforming a game-theoretic impossibility into a secure computation problem.
Mechanism Design Balances Decentralization and Efficiency in Verifiable Computation
New game-theoretic mechanisms characterize the decentralization-efficiency trade-off, enabling provably optimal design for verifiable computation markets.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment to Verifiably Honest Economic Rules
Cryptographic commitment to a hidden mechanism, verifiable via zero-knowledge proofs, enables trustless private economic systems.
Transaction Encryption and Ordering Randomization Mitigate Extractable Value
A new mechanism design model integrates transaction encryption and execution randomization to eliminate block producer control, ensuring provably fair transaction ordering and system integrity.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Cryptographic Whistleblowing Secures Protocols against Smart Collusion Incentives
This research introduces Cryptographic Whistleblowing, a mechanism design primitive that uses provable on-chain penalties to enforce honesty against financially rational colluders.
Concurrent Proposers and Conditional Tips Enforce Economic Censorship Resistance
Introducing conditional tips across concurrent block proposers creates a mechanism design solution, establishing a Proposer's Dilemma to enforce timely transaction inclusion.
Verifiable Decryption Secures Proposer-Builder Separation against Censorship
A new two-tiered architecture incorporates publicly verifiable decryption, resolving the censorship vulnerability inherent in existing block-building separation models.
Game Theory Secures Oracle Data Quality and Node Incentives
A Stackelberg game model resolves the oracle problem's incentive conflict, creating an equilibrium for secure, high-quality decentralized price feeds.
Formalizing MEV with Adversarial Knowledge Enables Provable Security
This abstract model defines Maximal Extractable Value via adversarial knowledge, providing the foundational theory for provable security against economic attacks.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Restaking Sybil-Proofness: An Impossibility Theorem Limits Slashing Mechanisms
A formal proof establishes that no single slashing mechanism can simultaneously deter both single and multi-identity Sybil attacks, revealing a foundational trade-off in economic security.
Reasonable-World Assumption Solves Zero Miner Revenue Impossibility Theorem
A new mechanism design incorporates honest user assumptions to achieve asymptotically optimal miner revenue, resolving a core theoretical conflict.
Time-Averaged Commitment Smooths MEV Auctions, Decentralizing Transaction Ordering
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
Mechanism Design Establishes Truthful Equilibrium in Blockchain Consensus
Applying game theory's revelation mechanisms directly to consensus disputes creates a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium that structurally compels truthful block validation.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Blockchain Digital Courts Enforce Agreements, Surpassing Traditional Legal Systems
This research introduces a novel "digital court" smart contract, leveraging behavioral incentives to enable self-enforcing agreements on blockchains, circumventing traditional legal enforcement.
