Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Provable Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous, abstract model of MEV to enable formal security proofs against economic attacks in decentralized systems.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Decouple Commitment from Disclosure in Mechanism Design
A novel framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable, private mechanism execution without trusted mediators, preserving strategic equivalence.
Uncertainty Principles Quantify MEV Trade-Offs in Blockchain Transaction Ordering
This research introduces uncertainty principles to model the fundamental trade-off between transaction reordering flexibility and user economic outcomes, revealing limits of universal MEV mitigation.
Optimistic Rollup Incentive Vulnerability Mitigated by Novel Mechanisms
New game-theoretic models reveal optimistic rollup dispute vulnerabilities, proposing escrowed rewards and commit-reveal protocols to secure validator incentives and deter fraud.
New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
Formalizing MEV for Provable Security in Blockchain Protocols
A new formal theory of MEV provides provable security against economic attacks, differentiating beneficial from malicious value extraction in blockchain protocols.
New Incentive Mechanism Secures Oracles against Mirroring Attacks
This research introduces a novel reward mechanism to prevent Sybil-like mirroring attacks in decentralized oracles, ensuring data integrity and fair compensation.
Incentivizing Federated Edge Learning via Game-Theoretic Blockchain Mechanisms
This research introduces a novel game-theoretic framework to incentivize participation and optimize resource pricing in blockchain-enabled federated edge learning, unlocking efficient decentralized AI.
Game-Theoretic Model Enhances Liquid Democracy Participation
A novel game-theoretic model analyzes voter behavior in liquid democracy, offering incentive structures to boost participation and decentralize governance.
