Formalizing MEV: Rigorous Model for Blockchain Economic Security
This research establishes a foundational theory of Maximal Extractable Value, enabling provable security against economic attacks in decentralized systems.
Game Theory Reveals Incentive-Driven Vulnerabilities in Blockchain Robustness.
This research unifies distributed systems and game theory to expose how rational validator incentives compromise Ethereum Proof-of-Stake safety and liveness, paving the way for resilient protocol design.
Absolute Commitments Enable Optimal MEV Extraction on Decentralized Exchanges
A novel attack leveraging absolute commitments allows adversaries to monopolize transaction fees, profoundly diminishing decentralized exchange utility.
New Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchains Optimizes Transaction Fees
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism for leaderless blockchains, ensuring block producer incentives and enhancing network efficiency.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Truthfulness
This research leverages Bayesian game theory to design blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, overcoming prior limitations to enable non-zero miner revenue while maintaining user truthfulness.
EarthOL: Verifiable Human Contributions Replace Blockchain Computational Waste.
EarthOL pioneers a consensus protocol, leveraging verifiable human contributions to supplant energy-intensive computation, fostering sustainable decentralized value.
Formalizing MEV: A Rigorous Abstract Model for Blockchain Security
This research introduces a formal, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling provable security against economic manipulation in blockchains.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, leveraging Bayesian game theory, to ensure miner revenue and user truthfulness, resolving a critical blockchain economic dilemma.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees
A novel first-price auction mechanism for leaderless blockchains ensures fair transaction fee distribution, fostering robust, decentralized block production.
