VeriLLM Enables Efficient, Secure, and Verifiable Decentralized LLM Inference
This research introduces a hybrid verification protocol for decentralized large language model inference, combining empirical checks with cryptographic guarantees to ensure output correctness with minimal overhead, thereby enabling trustworthy AI at scale.
Universal MEV Formalization Provides Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchain Security
This research introduces a rigorous, game-theoretic framework for Universal MEV, enabling formal analysis of contract vulnerabilities and advancing blockchain security.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment in Mechanism Design
This research introduces a framework for private mechanism design, allowing verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive details, thereby enhancing trust and efficiency in decentralized systems.
Game Theory Incentives Mitigate Malicious Blockchain Behavior
A novel graph-game theoretic model enhances blockchain security by designing incentives that enforce cooperative node behavior and deter malicious actions.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees and Miner Revenue
This research pioneers a Bayesian approach to blockchain transaction fees, overcoming prior incentive limitations and ensuring sustainable miner compensation.
Blockchain-Enabled Mechanisms Eliminate Trust for Fair Economic Systems
This research pioneers using blockchain for economic mechanisms, overcoming centralized trust vulnerabilities and ensuring auditability in resource allocation.
Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees: New Mechanism for Multi-Proposer Protocols
A novel game-theoretic model and FPA-EQ mechanism enable efficient, incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation in leaderless blockchains, crucial for scalable architectures.
Mechanism Design Ensures Truthful Blockchain Consensus, Enhancing Security and Scalability
This research leverages game-theoretic mechanism design to incentivize truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, fundamentally securing consensus and enabling scalable, fork-resistant blockchains.
Blockchain Mechanism Design: Unique Challenges and Strategic Imperatives
New research illuminates the inherent complexities of designing incentive mechanisms within permissionless blockchains, revealing novel challenges in economic coordination and protocol security.
