Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Restaking Sybil-Proofness: An Impossibility Theorem Limits Slashing Mechanisms
A formal proof establishes that no single slashing mechanism can simultaneously deter both single and multi-identity Sybil attacks, revealing a foundational trade-off in economic security.
Reasonable-World Assumption Solves Zero Miner Revenue Impossibility Theorem
A new mechanism design incorporates honest user assumptions to achieve asymptotically optimal miner revenue, resolving a core theoretical conflict.
Time-Averaged Commitment Smooths MEV Auctions, Decentralizing Transaction Ordering
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
Mechanism Design Establishes Truthful Equilibrium in Blockchain Consensus
Applying game theory's revelation mechanisms directly to consensus disputes creates a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium that structurally compels truthful block validation.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Blockchain Digital Courts Enforce Agreements, Surpassing Traditional Legal Systems
This research introduces a novel "digital court" smart contract, leveraging behavioral incentives to enable self-enforcing agreements on blockchains, circumventing traditional legal enforcement.
