Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment to Verifiably Honest Economic Rules
Cryptographic commitment to a hidden mechanism, verifiable via zero-knowledge proofs, enables trustless private economic systems.
Transaction Encryption and Ordering Randomization Mitigate Extractable Value
A new mechanism design model integrates transaction encryption and execution randomization to eliminate block producer control, ensuring provably fair transaction ordering and system integrity.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Formal MEV Theory Enables Provable Security against Transaction Reordering Attacks
A formal, abstract MEV theory rigorously defines adversarial gain via knowledge axiomatization, enabling proofs of smart contract security.
Cryptographic Whistleblowing Secures Protocols against Smart Collusion Incentives
This research introduces Cryptographic Whistleblowing, a mechanism design primitive that uses provable on-chain penalties to enforce honesty against financially rational colluders.
Concurrent Proposers and Conditional Tips Enforce Economic Censorship Resistance
Introducing conditional tips across concurrent block proposers creates a mechanism design solution, establishing a Proposer's Dilemma to enforce timely transaction inclusion.
Verifiable Decryption Secures Proposer-Builder Separation against Censorship
A new two-tiered architecture incorporates publicly verifiable decryption, resolving the censorship vulnerability inherent in existing block-building separation models.
Game Theory Secures Oracle Data Quality and Node Incentives
A Stackelberg game model resolves the oracle problem's incentive conflict, creating an equilibrium for secure, high-quality decentralized price feeds.
