Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in State Replication
By mapping the "equal opportunity" fairness problem to Differential Privacy, this research unlocks a new class of provably fair, bias-resistant transaction ordering mechanisms.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A novel revelation mechanism uses game theory to guarantee truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, simplifying consensus and boosting scalability.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Verifiable, Hidden Economic Mechanisms without Trusted Mediators
Cryptographic commitments hide mechanism rules while zero-knowledge proofs verify incentive compatibility, unlocking private, trustless economic design.
Dynamic Mechanism Stabilizes MEV Sharing between Users and Block Producers
This dynamic mechanism, inspired by EIP-1559, enshrines a variable MEV extraction rate to formally balance user and validator incentives for system robustness.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Revelation Mechanisms Secure Consensus against Untruthful Block Proposals
Mechanism design principles construct a revelation mechanism for Proof-of-Stake, establishing a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that compels validators to propose truthful blocks.
Multi-Party Computation Circumvents Impossibility in Decentralized Mechanism Design for Fair Fees
Cryptographic Multi-Party Computation enables collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms, transforming a game-theoretic impossibility into a secure computation problem.
