Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
Searcher-Auction Mechanism Solves Transaction Fee Incentive Impossibility
Mechanism design incorporating searchers is a theoretical necessity to achieve incentive-compatible transaction fee mechanisms and high social welfare simultaneously.
Reasonable-World Assumptions Achieve Optimal Miner Revenue in Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing reasonable-world assumptions circumvents the zero-revenue impossibility result, enabling incentive-compatible transaction fee auctions.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
Random Oracle Model Precludes Verifiable Delay Functions
This research fundamentally proves Verifiable Delay Functions cannot exist in the Random Oracle Model, challenging foundational assumptions for secure randomness in decentralized systems.
New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
