Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
        
        Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
        
        Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
        
        Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
        
        Random Oracle Model Precludes Verifiable Delay Functions
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research fundamentally proves Verifiable Delay Functions cannot exist in the Random Oracle Model, challenging foundational assumptions for secure randomness in decentralized systems.
        
        New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
