Active Block Producers Create Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible Fee Mechanisms
Formal analysis proves active block producers, driven by private MEV, fundamentally prevent simultaneous incentive-compatibility and welfare-maximization.
Formal Impossibility Limits Blockchain Fee Mechanism Design, Forcing Trade-Offs
New mechanism design research proves an impossibility for fully incentive-compatible transaction fee protocols, establishing a fundamental trade-off.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
Bitcoin Checkpointing Resolves Proof-of-Stake Long-Range Attack Impossibility
A new protocol secures Proof-of-Stake history by anchoring succinct commitments to Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work, providing non-slashable long-range attack safety.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Restaking Sybil-Proofness: An Impossibility Theorem Limits Slashing Mechanisms
A formal proof establishes that no single slashing mechanism can simultaneously deter both single and multi-identity Sybil attacks, revealing a foundational trade-off in economic security.
